Refl ective thinking can mean three diff erent things. A fi rst form of refl ective thinking consists in elaborating personal conceptions about the mental activities and abilities and in becoming aware of what occurs in our and other people's minds when we are engaged in intellectual tasks. Th is form of refl ective thinking encompasses the research fi eld usually labeled as "metacognition. " A second meaning of "refl ective thought" regards Th eory of Mind, which concerns more closely the realm of social interactions and relationships. Th eory of Mind in fact is conceived as the recognition of one's and others' aff ective and epistemic mental states as the psychological causes and motives underlying behaviors. Metacognition and Th eory of Mind are in part explicit and can be recognized by asking people to express verbally their beliefs about the mind; they are, however, also partially implicit, and they can be detected by observing how people behave -both in natural and in experimental settings -and speak. Th e third kind of refl ective thinking takes the form of narration. In this case individuals refl ect on their own and others' mental lives by trying to make sense of what happens within and around them. People's storytelling, on one hand, reveals their na ï ve psychological ideas and, on the other hand, hints at exploring and understanding their own and other persons' mental states and intentions better.
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Refl ective thinking can mean three diff erent things. A fi rst form of refl ective thinking consists in elaborating personal conceptions about the mental activities and abilities and in becoming aware of what occurs in our and other people's minds when we are engaged in intellectual tasks. Th is form of refl ective thinking encompasses the research fi eld usually labeled as "metacognition. " A second meaning of "refl ective thought" regards Th eory of Mind, which concerns more closely the realm of social interactions and relationships. Th eory of Mind in fact is conceived as the recognition of one's and others' aff ective and epistemic mental states as the psychological causes and motives underlying behaviors. Metacognition and Th eory of Mind are in part explicit and can be recognized by asking people to express verbally their beliefs about the mind; they are, however, also partially implicit, and they can be detected by observing how people behave -both in natural and in experimental settings -and speak. Th e third kind of refl ective thinking takes the form of narration. In this case individuals refl ect on their own and others' mental lives by trying to make sense of what happens within and around them. People's storytelling, on one hand, reveals their na ï ve psychological ideas and, on the other hand, hints at exploring and understanding their own and other persons' mental states and intentions better. Th e forms of refl ective thinking mentioned are seen as important competences that are needed to equip an individual to face the demands of reality. Th eir functional meaning appears in informal settings -such as spontaneous conversations and dialogues -as well as in formal contexts, such as instructional environments. Furthermore, they are shaped by interpersonal relationships and by literacy because an individual is an active partner in social exchanges, belongs to a given culture, and uses specifi c artifacts in which values, norms, and rules are embedded.
A refl ective attitude about our own mental processes is a somewhat "unnatural" attitude. Our mind is set to understand the external reality and not to refl ect on itself. Th e recursive process that causes the mind to focus on itself instead of the external content is the exception and not the rule in psychic activity in general. Only when there are particular diffi culties or errors that we fi nd that we have made are we led to ask questions about how we proceed and then induced to reconstruct mentally the paths we have followed or are following. Th is means that the request to adopt a refl ective attitude is not an easy request because this attitude is not the most habitual and familiar to individuals. We must keep in mind possible resistance and failure. Th e consequence is that we must be prepared for a long period of assimilation and promote the motivation to be engaged in refl ective operations.
Second, refl ection is an individual activity that is likely to place the subject in an almost solipsistic position. Th ere are certainly moments during the intellectual growth of individuals in which isolation and retreat into themselves are important. In response to intrusive environmental inputs, "closing" the channel of communication with the outside world and reserving space for introspection are steps that now are rarely attempted, but they are essential to preserve the possibility of evaluating, reasoning, and deciding. But we must not forget the natural inclination of the relational subject. Opportunities for sharing the results of our refl ections and reconstructing the mental functioning of others can help avoid this individualistic drift . Another antidote to solipsism is the realization that sometimes refl ection is developed through social interaction. Awareness about the mental processes involved in an activity sometimes results from discussion, from Introduction 3 conversation, or from social comparison. Th is indicates that much thought is actually incorporated in artifacts and technologies outside the mind. Th e results of the refl ection on one's mental processes, in fact, fi nd expression in artistic works and computer tools. Th ere are paintings and sculptures that depict not only people engaged in refl ective activities -thereby signalling the attitudes, even bodily (posture, muscle tension, gestures, facial expressions, etc.) that accompany such activities -but also the consequences of refl ective thinking in real life. Today's technology can amplify these expressive possibilities of refl ection. What people write in their blogs, chat documents, Web sites, and videos they create to share with friends very oft en have a refl ective component as they include the expression of mental states and processes that accompany experiences of life. Refl ection is not so explicit only in the intangible introspections of individuals; it is also detectable in concrete material products, which can provide interesting insights and tools for education and training.
Th e characteristics of refl ection we have mentioned -that is, social sharing and embodiment in cultural artifacts -are well represented by narratives. Narrating is a social act not only addressed to exchanging information, but also to putting in order our experiences and giving them an inner and shared organization. By narrating -and so giving the sequence of their experiences by linking them with temporal connectives and causal relations -people give meaning to their own and others' events. As the Italian writer Alessandro Baricco stated in an interview: "Th e facts become your life or when you crash, directly, or when someone composes them into a story and sends them to you in the head. . . . Th e story, and not information, makes you master of your history. " Narrative thinking is closely related to metacognitive refl ection. When you tell a story, you are induced to make reference, implicitly or explicitly, to your own mental states (by expressing your own perspective -namely, your intentions, emotions, beliefs, and so on -on the events you are reporting), as well as to other people's mental states (their intentions, emotions, beliefs). When you begin telling www.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-02573-8 -Reflective Thinking in Educational Settings: A Cultural Framework Edited by Alessandro Antonietti, Emanuela Confalonieri and Antonella Marchetti Excerpt More information a story, you are induced to refl ect about why you decided to tell such a story (what is your actual motivation?) and how you are telling that story (am I succeeding in leading my listeners to understand or in impressing, convincing, entertaining them?). Th us, refl ective thinking is deeply involved in narrating.
Th e present book includes a series of chapters addressing diff erent aspects of the role played by refl ective thinking in educational contexts such as family, school, and university. Th e general framework shared by the contributors takes into account the role played by culture in fostering the acquisition of cognitive, linguistic, and social skills. Th e main aim of the book concerns the attempt to collect in the same volume contributions sharing the common assumptions mentioned, derived from diff erent specifi c research areas, to allow readers to understand the possible intersections among these areas. Another aim is to show that the core ideas associated with refl ective thinking, those resulting from the relationships between meta-representation and narrative, can be applied to diff erent contexts and to diff erent developmental levels.
Th e main objective is to highlight possible connections among fi elds that are usually conceived as separate, by assuming a life-span perspective and taking into account diff erent age levels and diff erent developmental issues. Both typical and atypical development, both intraindividual and interindividual processes, both personal and public/institutional factors were considered, and diff erent educational settings, symbolic systems, and learning procedures were analyzed.
Th e contents of the volume are organized in two parts. Each part is concluded by a commentary in which the authors (respectively, Giorgio Battistelli and Jens Brockmeier together with Bruce Homer) try to consider globally the chapters of the corresponding section, fi nding possible threads connecting them and discussing the whole picture that emerges.
In the fi rst part the role of representations and metarepresentations is addressed. Th e fi rst chapter (Social Development and the
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Development of Social Representations: Two Sides of the Same Coin?) by Felice Carugati and Patrizia Selleri tries to answer a series of questions oft en recurring within the approaches to the psychological development: How do children make sense of the social world? How do they represent the various exchanges that characterize the social life where they are embedded? How does their knowledge diff er from that of the adults in their communities, and what is the process through which this knowledge is acquired? Development is seen as the outcome of processes of social interaction, dialogue, communication, and conversations, all leading children to refl ect on their own mental and interpersonal processes. For this reason, social psychology and developmental psychology are not distinct enterprises. Moscovici's theory of social representations off ers a useful theoretical framework to deal with this issue through the conceptualization of three levels in social representation development: the sociogenesis, the ontogenesis, and the microgenesis of social representation (SR). Some examples are off ered as regards the level of the ontogenesis of SR (acquisition of social gender identities, representation of intelligence, and school abilities as sociocognitive tools). Th e process of interpretive reproduction proposed by Corsaro is recognized as a method for the integration of ontogenesis and microgenesis of children's SR within a cultural framework.
Th e second chapter (Learning from Multimedia Artifacts: Th e Role of Metacognition), written by Alessandro Antonietti and Barbara Colombo, shift s to the role of metacognition in multimedia learning. Multimedia educational artifacts incorporate cultural assumptions and implicit theories concerning the way people believe such tools should be used. Hence, structuring a theoretical framework focused on the actual role of metacognition in multimedia learning appears to be extremely relevant. Th e authors tried to understand which models of metacognition are mostly assumed in relation to multimedia artifacts and, more specifi cally, which roles metacognition has in relation to multimedia, and, fi nally, which eff ects, if any, metacognition seems to have concerning diff erent aspects of multimedia. Th e chapter highlights how studies converged on three main aspects: metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive monitoring, and metacognitive control. Furthermore, it was possible to identify three diff erent perspectives concerning the role ascribed to metacognition: Th e more simple one sees technology as a tool to promote metacognition; a second perspective sees metacognition and learning as linked, and technology is here intended as a tool to scaff old this twofold relationship; the last perspective sees metacognition and technology as useful to promote eff ective learning if and when used together. All perspectives but one seem to record both positive and negative results linking metacognition and multimedia. Th e last perspective, however, appeared to be the most promising since it fostered self-refl ection and self-regulation. Yet, it is important not to forget that metacognitive competence is not always necessary or advisable in multimedia learning. A metacognitive attitude has its costs and has to be used only when needed. Pros and cons of metacognition in the fi eld of multimedia learning are discussed by taking into account that media use always occurs within a cultural context, and so cultural meanings associated with the multimedia tools cannot be neglected.
Th e third chapter (Th eory of Mind in Typical and Atypical Developmental Settings: Some Considerations from a Contextual Perspective) by Antonella Marchetti, Ilaria Castelli, Giulia Cavalli, Eleonora Di Terlizzi, Flavia Lecciso, Barbara Lucchini, Davide Massaro, Serena Petrocchi, and Annalisa Valle discusses the more recent theoretical perspectives on Th eory of Mind development. From a sociocultural perspective it considers the most innovative contributions available in the scientifi c literature on Th eory of Mind, exploring both typical and atypical contexts of development and education. In particular, the fi rst part of the chapter is dedicated to typical settings and focuses attention on those aspects of development that seem to "contribute to" and/or "accompany" Th eory of Mind in terms of precursors as well as interacting abilities. In this sense it discusses the link Introduction 7 between Th eory of Mind and attachment in familiar and scholastic settings of caregiving and the role of pretense and language in specifi c relational contexts. Th e second part of the chapter deals with the atypical development, considering the case of autistic and deaf children, who represent two of the most challenging fi elds of investigation as regards the topics of deviance versus delay in Th eory of Mind development. Finally, the last part of the chapter is about the most recent frontiers of this area of research, which in the employment of highly sophisticated technology (for example, brain imaging) constitute the next step for new insights on Th eory of Mind development.
Th e subsequent contributions included in the fi rst section of the book report the results of experimental studies. Th e fourth chapter (Th e Use of Metacognitive Language in Story Retelling: Th e Intersection between Th eory of Mind and Story Comprehension) by Janette Pelletier, Kathleen Hipfner-Boucher, and Antoinette Doyle is focused on the types of adult-child interactions that support the development of early literacy and is aimed at clarifying the relationships between these interactions and reading and writing outcomes in school. Narrative competency, a component of emergent literacy generally measured in terms of storytelling ability, has been the subject of investigation by researchers attempting to elucidate the relationship between the preschooler's skill in interpreting and producing narrative accounts and later reading comprehension. In the past decade, Th eory of Mind development and narrative comprehension, as intersecting processes, have become an area of increasing interest to researchers in both fi elds. In this chapter, the Th eory of Mind achievements of typically developing kindergarten children are considered in relation to the transactional processes of meaning making in storybook reading experiences. Th is chapter shows that four-to six-year-old children bring social understandings to storybook-based interactions in order to construct meaning actively from text and that these understandings are manifested in their appropriate use of metacognitive language. Th e fi ndings of a cross-sectional study aimed at investigating kindergarten children's production of mental state verbs in a story retell task are presented and discussed in terms of their relation to concurrent measures of narrative comprehension. Implications for educational and instructional practices are discussed as well.
Th e last chapter of the fi rst part (Language Access and Th eory of Mind Reasoning: Evidence from Deaf Children in Bilingual and Oralist Environments) was coauthored by Marek Meristo, Kerstin W. Falkman, Erland Hjelmquist, Mariantonia Tedoldi, Luca Surian, and Michael Siegal. Th e investigation reported in this chapter examined whether access to sign language as a medium for instruction infl uences Th eory of Mind reasoning in deaf children with similar home language environments. Th e fi rst experiment involved ninety-seven Italian deaf children aged four to twelve years: Fift y-six were from deaf families and had Italian Sign Language as their native language, and forty-one had acquired Italian Sign Language as late signers aft er contact with signers outside their hearing families. Children receiving bimodal/bilingual instruction in Italian Sign Language together with Sign Supported and spoken Italian signifi cantly outperformed children in oralist schools where communication was in Italian and oft en relied on lipreading. Th e second experiment involved sixty-one deaf children in Estonia and Sweden aged six to sixteen years. On a wide variety of Th eory of Mind tasks, bilingually instructed native signers in Estonian Sign Language and spoken Estonian succeeded at a level similar to that of age-matched hearing children. Th ey outperformed bilingually instructed late signers and native signers attending oralist schools. Particularly for native signers, access to sign language in a bilingual environment may facilitate conversational exchanges that promote the expression of Th eory of Mind (ToM) by enabling children to monitor others' mental states eff ectively.
Th e second part of the book addresses the topic of narrative thinking. It is introduced by a chapter (Narrative, Culture, and Psychology) by Jerome Bruner. In this contribution it is argued that psychology seeks to understand the human condition, but the latter is not easily by courts and panels. Bureaucracies are the social systems that result from the application of these principles to complex social goals and problems. Th ey allow the possibility that complex tasks can be dissolved into established rules and procedures carried out by persons trained to play particular roles. Th ese explicit rules and procedures apply not only to the society but to the mental lives of individuals. What the chapter argues is that the institutions of a bureaucratic society are themselves literate institutions. Bureaucracies not only use literacy; they embody the very practices of literacy, practices described in terms of explicit rules and procedures. Th us, literacy plays a role not only in consciousness of language and consciousness of mind, but also in the explicitness of arguments, the uses of evidence, and the forms of discourse appropriate to such specialized institutions as economics, law, science, and literature. A literate society is one that is both societally literate, having in place the infrastructure for the systematic, bureaucratic management of social aff airs, and personally literate, composed of a citizenry with the knowledge and willingness to participate fully in these governing institutions. Schools, through their literate activities, provide a bridge between these two.
Th e third chapter (Teaching Writing to Undergraduate Psychology Students as Socialization to a Genre) by Pietro Boscolo starts by stressing that writing a dissertation or thesis for a graduate degree (M.A.) in psychology is a demanding task for graduate students, who have to use their knowledge and writing skills in a way quite diff erent from high school compositions -in fact, they have to learn a new genre. In this chapter, students' progress and diffi culties in their socialization with a new genre are analyzed and discussed on the basis of the author's experience of teaching academic writing to psychology undergraduate students. When learning to write a dissertation, students have to deal with three levels of diffi culty. Th e lowest level regards the structure of the dissertation, which can be a report of an empirical study or a critical review, and must be written according to the rules and norms of the international psychological community. Th e second level of diffi culty
